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HUMAN FACTORS INVESTIGATION METHODOLOGY 
 
Sarah Harris 
Royal Air Force (RAF) Centre of Aviation Medicine 
RAF Henlow, United Kingdom 
 
There are many tools for assessing the Human Factors (HF) of accidents. Although these tools 
can aid the classification of factors in military accidents, they do not completely support the 
military investigation process. The RAF has therefore adapted the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) to develop a new Human Factors Investigation Methodology. 
This methodology combines some of the HFACS categories with the military operational 
process, providing a timeline to plot when accident factors may have emerged and a source 
framework to plot whether the factor emerged at the organisation, supervisory, task, equipment, 
environment or operator level. The benefit of the methodology is that it helps identify at which 
point the factor influenced one of the four key accident events; hazard entry, recovery, escape and 
survival, thus facilitating more effective recommendations. As it is generic, the methodology can 
be used for any investigation type, including preventative investigations.  
 
This paper describes initial difficulties experienced with current investigation and classification 
tools and how a new methodology was developed to address these difficulties. Each part of the 
methodology is discussed in turn, along with recommendations for further development. 
 
Requirement 
The RAF initially used HFACS (Wiegmann and Shappell (2003)) to understand and classify 
accidents. Although this approach was effective at classifying accident factors and Reason’s Swiss 
Cheese Model of Latent and Active Failures (Reason (1990)) was effective at understanding errors, 
neither approach was conducive for mapping to the standard military aviation process. Specifically, it did 
not reflect the timeline element of the military accident, which made it difficult to plot at which point 
each factor became a contributor, e.g. a pre-condition for an unsafe act can occur as a result of a previous 
unsafe act, making the standard template of supervision>preconditions>unsafe act difficult to use. Most 
importantly, the framework was not conducive for explaining to and integrating with the remaining 
Investigation Panel, who may have limited understanding of human factors and how HFACS may 
integrate with their part of the investigation.  
 
Although other investigation tools are available, these are typically designed to provide inter-rater 
reliability and validity when offered across investigators to be applied to their accident scenario. Although 
these variables are important when non HF experts are attempting to understand their identified unsafe 
acts, these tools were found to be either too prescriptive and/or they focused mainly on the accident event 
itself. Again, they were not conducive for visual presentation to the remaining Investigating Panel as the 
models were visually different from their perception of the aviation process. Investigator buy-in and HF 
integration are key aspects to any investigation if the HF Investigation is to be effective. 
 
To this end, as accidents and incidents occurred, a new methodology was developed. This 
included a timeline that visually represented the aviation process and allowed a more detailed 




The Human Factors Investigation Methodology was developed to meet the investigation 
requirements. This methodology was developed throughout more than 30 military aircraft accidents, of 
which involved fixed-wing, rotary, multi-engine and unmanned aircraft and accident types from mid-air 
collisions to enemy action. This wide variety of accidents enabled the methodology to be refined as and 
when development issues arose.  
 
As the methodology developed it was clear it would be based around some kind of timeline. It 
was also clear the factors from HFACS would also have to be represented as not only were these factors 
technically valid, they would also still be used in the post-accident phase of classification. This resulted in 
the identification of two axis: a timeline of events and a source for the type of factor. For this reason a 
matrix was developed to plot these two axis.  
 
On the Y axis high level HFACS categories were plotted with some amendments: 
 
1. A ‘task’ level was introduced to explicitly examine what it was the operator was trying to do 
at the time of the incident or accident. Specifically, this enabled explicit examination of the 
estimated margin for error for that task to assess its performance reliability.  
2. The categories ‘environment’ and ‘equipment’ were separated out from technological 
environment and physical environment. This was easier to visually present to the remaining 
Investigation Panel.  
3. Unsafe Acts or Acts were made into ‘behaviours and actions’ to include actions that were 
positive or benign, such as eating habits and secondary taskings.      
4. The sub-categories within each level were broken out to include the most common areas 
within the military process. Not every sub-division within HFACS was represented at each 
relevant level as the methodology was designed to be an aid to detect routes, timings and 
relationships and not to be entirely prescriptive.    
 
On the X axis the timeline was initially divided into ‘Entry Conditions’ to reflect those factors 
that occurred prior to the day of the event and the ‘Accident Point’, to reflect those factors that occurred 
on the day of the event. However, it was soon clear a distinction had to be made within the Accident Point 
to include a ‘Readiness’ stage, i.e. the stage the operator prepared themselves for what it was they were 
doing at the time of the accident.  It then became apparent that the X axis timeline represented two ‘Key 
Transition Points’ (KTP): Entry Conditions > Accident Point and Readiness > In-Flight. These points 
were clear stages in the accident route when existing hazards and risks could have been mitigated. For this 
reason, estimation of the KTPs was included as a specific stage in the methodology.  
 
Accounting for the X and Y axis, the matrix was termed ‘Accident Route Matrix’ (ARM). 
 
During the refinement of the methodology additional factors were also realised. It became 
apparent there were certain questions that an HF investigator needed to answer to understand the 
sequence of events. By answering these questions it not only ensured the HF Investigator understood the 
accident but it also acted as a checklist for ensuring they had sufficient evidence. For this reason, the 10 
important questions were termed ‘Key Accident Characteristics’ and also included as a specific stage in 
the methodology. Further, it became clear there were always four factors that occurred in the accident 
sequence: Hazard Entry, Recovery Response, Escape Response and Survival Response. For this reason, 
these factors were included in the ARM and ‘Hazard Management’ became another stage in the 
methodology. Finally, it was also realised that it was equally important to look at, from a HF perspective, 




The methodology consists of seven elements; Evidence Collection, ARM, Key Accident 









Subjective evidence. The initial stage of the methodology is to collect time-critical subjective 
evidence as soon as feasible post-crash. This usually involves one to one detailed interviews with the 
relevant operators using a semi-structured format. The types of questions usually follow the framework of 
the ARM (see Figure 2) but they can vary if required. Subjective data is collated for pilots within the 
aircraft (crew) and between aircraft (formation) to compare mission perspectives. Subjective data is also 
collated for other relevant parties such as Engineers, Supervisors and Air Traffic Controllers. Although 
not prescriptive, the subjective data can include performance data, which can be achieved by asking the 
operator to rate factors such as perceived arousal, demands, difficulty, frustration, pressure, awareness, 
understanding, communications and predicted success for each key phase of flight. For this methodology, 
individuals estimate these factors by pointing at a simple Very Low > Very High 5-point scale. The 
operator is also questioned on their point of focus, decisions and actions.  Operators are then asked to 
estimate their views on Entry Condition and Readiness factors by pointing at a simple colour coded Ideal 
> OK > Poor > Very Poor 4-point scale. Although perceived estimates are not considered scientifically 
valid accounting for error in judgement, memory decay and distortion, the change in ratings, or the report 
of very negative ratings, has proved very useful for identifying areas for further assessment. 
 
Objective Evidence. To validate subjective data, objective data from the crash site and Aircraft 
Data Recorder can be used to ascertain actual control inputs, crew communications, aircraft performance 
and hazard management.  
 
 
Accident Route Matrix 
 
The ARM forms the basis of the new HF methodology (see Figure 2). The ARM assists the HF 
investigation process by providing a framework to plot the subjective and objective data. Factors can be 
plotted by type (those at the Organisation, Supervision, Equipment, Environment or Operator level) and 
by time of effect (Entry Conditions or Accident Point). Data can be actually plotted using a blank ARM 
or the investigator can plot evidence in a report using the ARM as a framework. Once completed, the 
ARM can be read from top to bottom to understand how factors eventually influence Operator behaviours 
and operator Conditions, or it can be read left to right on each row to assess the route-cause of in-flight 
events, e.g. an unusual tasking in-flight may be explained by looking at typical tasking in the Entry 






Element 2 of the Human Factors Investigation Methodology: Accident Route Matrix 
 
The ARM framework is based around a typical military aviation process. Within the Entry 
Conditions on the left-hand side, Organisation factors will influence the working environment in which 
the pilot will be working, Supervision and culture will influence the life the pilot will have on their 
Squadron and Equipment and Environment factors will influence their experience of flying.  
 
 
In terms of the end state or effect of this, the Operator Behaviours section reflects what they have 
been doing, accounting for the conditions, tools and tasking, and how this has influenced their learning, 
associations and ultimately reinforcement of their behaviour. All factors eventually lead to Operator 
Conditions, i.e. the preceding condition the operator was in leading up to the accident day. Within the 
central Readiness column, the operator’s Readiness will be influenced by the Entry Conditions + any 
over-night or on-the-day factors. At this point the operator may enter the planning and briefing stage and 
eventually, prior to take-off, their mission Readiness will be influenced by all Entry Conditions and 
Readiness factors. Post take-off the operator will enter the In-Flight stage and at some point, will pass 
through to the Post-Flight stage. This sequence can be applied to other operators, as it can be used to 
reflect generic on-shift Readiness and on-task performance.    
 
Realistically in an accident sequence, subjective data is used to initially plot the centre and right-
hand side of the ARM. As the investigation progresses, further subjective data may be collected and the 
ARM can be built up progressing to the left-hand side as appropriate. If available, further data from the 
aircraft, such as the Aircraft Data Recorder, Cockpit Voice Recorder and Head Up Display may be 
available to validate the ARM, turning any suspect or reported data into actual data.  
 
Key Accident Characteristics 
 
The investigator can now use the Key Accident Characteristics to ensure most significant data has 
been collected. Although this checklist is not exhaustive, it does act as a good prompt during the 
investigation. The Key Accident Characteristics include: 
 
1. Was the operator suitably qualified?  
2. Was the operator suitably current?  
3. Had they recently practiced the task?  
4. Had they been in the same situation before?  
5. Was the task suitably planned?  
6. Was the task achievable / reliably achievable?  
7. Was the task justified (accounting for operational benefit v risk)?  
8. Was the task correct (accounting for current procedures and rules)?  
9. Was the task suitably authorised?   




A Hazard Management assessment will help the HF Investigator identify how the crew managed 
the accident and how they progressed into the escape and survival stages. With both subjective and 





Element 4 of the Human Factors Investigation Methodology: Hazard Management 
 
 
Key Transition Points 
 
Once the ARM has been completed and the HF Investigator is confident all available data has 
been assessed, the two KTPs can be qualitatively estimated (see Figure 2 for location of KTPs).  
 
1. KTP 1 is based on the identified Entry Conditions and addresses the question - what was the 
level of risk carried for the entire Squadron, i.e. were all pilots at risk of this accident?  
2. KTP 2 is based on the identified Readiness stage and addresses the question - what was the 
level of risk carried for the specific crew, i.e. were the crew at risk of this accident before 
they even took off?  
 
These questions will help identify at which point the hazard/risk developed to a point it increased 




Once the ARM and KTPs have been completed, the HF Investigator should use knowledge of 
information processing and perception to qualitatively estimate whether the hazards and risks could have 
been realistically detected by either the crew and/or the supervisory chain. Such information facilitates a 




The final stage of the methodology is to provide advice based on the outputs of the investigation. 
Advice can be at any of the ARM levels and can state its probable improvement of one or more of the 
four key accident factors - Hazard Entry, Recovery Response, Escape Response and Survival Response. 
 
Conclusion and Application of the Human Factors Investigation Methodology 
 
The Human Factors Investigation Methodology has been developed to the stage it is usable for all 
accident sequences and aircraft types. It is also usable for all levels of operators, e.g. for a supervised 
individual and their supervisor. It can be used preceding use of HFACS and it can be used as a 
preventative methodology. The RAF currently use the methodology to conduct Operational Events 
Analysis, which includes application of the Human Factors Investigation Methodology but before an 
accident has happened.  
 
However, for the methodology to be distributed as a tool, scientific validation would need to be 
conducted to assess factors such as inter-rater reliability. Further, should the methodology be required to 
produce quantitative results, the KTPs and Detection elements would need further work to ascertain if risk 
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